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Abstract. Deduction modulo is an extension of first-order predicate
logic where axioms are replaced by a congruence relation on proposi-
tions and where many theories, such as arithmetic, simple type theory
and some variants of set theory, can be expressed. An important question
in deduction modulo is to find a condition of the theories that have the
strong normalization property. Dowek and Werner have given a semantic
sufficient condition for a theory to have the strong normalization prop-
erty: they have proved a ”soundness” theorem of the form: if a theory
has a model (of a particular form) then it has the strong normalization
property. In this paper, we refine their notion of model in a way allowing
not only to prove soundness, but also completeness: if a theory has the
strong normalization property, then it has a model of this form. The key
idea of our model construction is a refinement of Girard’s notion of re-
ducibility candidates. By providing a sound and complete semantics for
theories having the strong normalization property, this paper contributes
to explore the idea that strong normalization is not only a proof-theoretic
notion, but also a model-theoretic one.
In this paper, we define a sound and complete semantics for theories having
the strong normalization property in minimal deduction modulo.
Deduction modulo [5] is a logical framework, based on Natural Deduction
where axioms are replaced by a congruence relation on propositions, allowing to
express proofs of many theories like arithmetic [9], simple type theory [6], some
variants of set theory [7], etc... The absence of axioms ensures the fact that all
cut-free proofs end with an introduction rule, as in usual Natural Deduction.
Hence the cut elimination property of a theory entails its consistency. In this
framework, cuts in proofs are represented by β-redexes, and the elimination of a
cut, by β-reduction. Therefore strong normalization of the β-reduction ensures
the cut elimination property of the corresponding theory, and furthermore its
consistency.
The usual tool to prove strong normalization is called reducibility candidates.
The notion of reducibility candidates was first introduced by J.Y. Girard [11],
following the work of W.W. Tait [18]. We can see a posteriori their work as proofs
of strong normalization, obtained by the existence of a C-valued model, where
C is the algebra of reducibility candidates. This work has been extended to, at
least, two non-trivial logical frameworks: Pure Type Systems by P.A. Melliès and
B. Werner [16], and Deduction modulo by G. Dowek and B. Werner [8]. By non-
trivial, we mean that these logical frameworks can express strongly normalizing
and not strongly normalizing theories. In other words, they proved that having a
C-valued model is a sufficient semantic condition of strongly normalizing theories
expressed in Pure Type Systems and Deduction modulo.
Reducibility candidates are a very useful tool to prove strong normalization
but we may wonder if it is an exhaustive test. Is having a C-valued model also
a necessary semantic condition for the strong normalization property, i.e. do
all strongly normalizing theories expressed in Deduction modulo or Pure Type
Systems have a C-valued model ?
In this paper, we exhibit a new algebra C′ which is a refinement of C and
we prove that having a C′-valued model is still a sufficient semantic condition
of strongly normalizing theories expressed in minimal deduction modulo. And
moreover, that it is also a necessary semantic condition of strongly normalizing
theories.
1 Minimal deduction modulo and truth values algebras
Let us first define the logical framework we use in this paper: minimal deduction
modulo is deduction modulo with only two connectives : ⇒ and ∀ .
1.1 Minimal deduction modulo
Syntax Our language of propositions is that of multi-sorted first-order logic.
Propositions are built up from predicates given by a many-sorted predicate lan-
guage 〈T,F,P〉 which contains a set T of sorts, a set F of function symbols, and a
set P of predicate symbols. Given a infinite set of variables for each sort T in T,
we build terms and atomic propositions, by using the following rules: variables
of sort T are terms of sort T ; if f is a function symbol of rank 〈T1, . . . , Tn, U〉
and t1, . . . , tn are respectively terms of sort T1, . . . , Tn, then f t1 . . . tn is a term
of sort U ; if P is a predicate symbol of rank 〈T1, . . . , Tn〉 and t1, . . . , tn are
respectively terms of sort T1, . . . , Tn, then P t1 . . . tn is an atomic proposition.
Propositions are built-up from atomic propositions with the usual connective
⇒ and quantifier ∀ : an atomic proposition is a proposition and if A and B are
propositions and x is a term-variable then ∀x.A and A ⇒ B are propositions.
Remark that, implicitly, quantification in ∀x.A is restricted over the sort of the
variable x. We call P the set of propositions.
In this logical framework, we provide proof-terms which represent construc-
tors of proof derivations. Each proof-term construction corresponds to a natural
deduction rule: proof-terms of the form α express proofs built with the axiom
rule, proof-terms of the form λα.π and (π π′) express proofs built respectively
with the introduction and elimination rules of the implication and proof-terms
of the form λx.π and (π t) express proofs built with the introduction and elimi-
nation rules of the universal quantifier.
We call neutral those proof-terms that are not abstractions i.e. the proof-
terms of the form α, (ππ′) or (πt).
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Notice that in this language, proof-terms can contain both term variables
(written x, y, . . .) and proof variables (written α, β, . . .). Terms are written t, u, . . .
while proof-terms are written π, ρ, . . .
Typing rules We call contexts, lists of declarations [α : A] where α is a proof-
variable and A is a proposition, such that each variable is declared at most
once. In this way, we only consider well formed contexts, therefore we have to
rename variables when concatening contexts: the only proof-variables that two
concatened contexts can share have to be declared proofs of the same proposition.
Notice that as we declare only proof-variables and not term-variables in contexts,
the concatenation of two contexts is, modulo renaming, always a context.
Given a congruence relation on propositions ≡ , we define typing rules as
usual, in deduction modulo:
A ≡ B (axiom)
Γ, α : A ⊢≡ α : B
Γ, α : A ⊢≡ π : B C ≡ A ⇒ B (⇒-intro)
Γ ⊢≡ λα π : C




C ≡ A ⇒ B (⇒-elim)
ΓΓ ′ ⊢≡ (π π
′) : B
Γ ⊢≡ π : A B ≡ ∀x.A, x 6∈ FV (Γ ) (∀-intro)
Γ ⊢≡ λx.π : B
Γ ⊢≡ π : B B ≡ ∀x.A, C ≡ (t/x)A, t has the sort of x (∀-elim)
Γ ⊢≡ π t : C
Fig. 1. Typing rules
The point is that a proposition can be replaced by an equivalent one, at any
place in a proof derivation.
Proof reduction rules and strong normalization In deduction modulo, the
process of cut elimination is modeled by β-reduction. We consider the contextual
closure of the reduction rules given figure 2. These rules correspond to proof
reduction in natural deduction.
(λα.π π′) → (π′/α)π
(λx.π t) → (t/x)π
Fig. 2. Proof reduction rules
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We write (π′/α)π (resp. (t/x)π) the substitution of α (resp. x) by π′ (resp. t) in π.
A proof-term is said to be normal if it contains no redex and strongly normaliz-
ing if all reduction sequences starting from this proof-term are finite. We write
SN for the set of strongly normalizing proof-terms.
A proof-term is called isolated if it is neutral and only reduces to neutral proof-
terms (i.e it never reduces to an abstraction, in any number of reduction steps).
Theories expressed in minimal deduction modulo A theory expressed in
minimal deduction modulo is defined by a many-sorted language in predicate
logic 〈T,F,P〉 and a congruence relation ≡ on propositions of the associated
many-sorted logic. Given a theory 〈T,F,P〉≡, we will write ⊢ for ⊢≡.
1.2 Language dependent truth values algebras
Truth values algebras (tvas) are an extension of Heyting algebras, defined by
G. Dowek in [4], which provide an algebraic setting to study consistency and
cut elimination of theories expressed in deduction modulo. We use in this paper
language-dependent truth values algebras (ldtvas) which are both a simplifica-
tion and a refinement of tvas. They are first a simplification because they do
not include the notion of positive truth values, as we only consider theories where
axioms are expressed within the congruence relation and not given by inference
rules. They also are a refinement in the sense that we use a functional interpre-
tation of the connective ∀ (as in [10]), instead of a set-theoritic intersection. See
[2] for details.
For all sorts T , we write T̂ , the set of closed terms (terms which do not contain
variables) of sort T .
LDTVAS Given a many-sorted language in predicate logic 〈T,F,P〉, a ldtva
for this language is an algebraic structure 〈B, ⇒̂, (ÂT ), (∀̂T )〉 where B is a set
(called the domain), ⇒̂ is a function from B × B to B, and for all sorts T of T,
ÂT is a set of functions from T̂ to B and ∀̂T is a function from ÂT to B.
Notice that we will write B both for denominating the ldtva B and its domain.
A valuation ϕ is a substitution mapping term-variables of a sort T to closed
terms of sort T . For all propositions A, we call Val(A) the set of valuations
whose domain contains the set of free variables of A. And we write dom(ϕ) the
domain of a valuation ϕ. For all A ∈ P and ϕ ∈ Val(A), we write Aϕ the result
of the valuation ϕ on A.
Models We call B-valued interpretations those functions which map every or-
dered pair of a proposition A and a valuation in Val(A) to an element of the
domain of the ldtva B.
A B-valued interpretation J.K. is a B-valued model if and only if:
for all A,B ∈ P, ϕ ∈ Val(A ⇒ B), x of sort T , t ∈ T̂ and ψ ∈ Val(∀x.A),
JA⇒ BKϕ = JAKϕ ⇒̂ JBKϕ, (t 7→ JAKψ+〈x,t〉) ∈ ÂT ,
J∀x.AKψ = ∀̂T (t 7→ JAKψ+〈x,t〉), and J(t/x)AKψ = JAKψ+〈x,t〉.
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We also say that the B-valued interpretation J.K. is adapted to the connectives.
A B-valued model J.K. is a model of the theory 〈T,F,P〉≡ if and only if:
for allA,A′ ∈ P, ϕ ∈ Val(A) and ψ ∈ Val(A′), if Aϕ ≡ A
′
ψ, then JAKϕ = JA
′Kψ
We also say that the B-valued model J.K. is adapted to the congruence.
Morphisms of LDTVAS are defined as usual and morphisms from B1 to B2
induce a mapping from B1-valued models to B2-valued models of a same theory.
2 Reducibility candidates
2.1 The adequation lemma
The reducibility candidates were first defined by J.Y. Girard in its proof of strong
normalization of system F, following the work of W.W. Tait for system T. The
main idea of this kind of proofs of strong normalization is to define a class of
sets of proof-terms which contains all proofs of propositions and contains only
strongly normalizing proof-terms. More precisely, the point is to first assign to
each proposition A, a set of strongly normalizing proof-terms RA. And then
prove an adequation lemma: every proof of A is in RA (hence is strongly nor-
malizing). In order to prove this adequation lemma, it is sufficient to prove the
following statements: each RA is stable by β-reduction; if a neutral proof reduces
only to elements of a RA then it is also in RA; and RA⇒B is exactly the set of
proof-terms which map proof-terms in RA to proof-terms in RB (and an analog
property for each connective).
2.2 C, the TVA of reducibility candidates
G. Dowek and B. Werner extended this kind of proofs of strong normalization to
deduction modulo [8], by adding one more condition on reducibility candidates:
the fact that if A and B are equivalent propositions, then RA = RB .
In [4], G. Dowek showed that reducibility candidates form a tva C and reex-
pressed the previous proof in an algebraic view: having a C-valued-model is a suf-
ficient condition for a theory to be strongly normalizing. Like ldtvas, tvas are
based on a domain and a function space ⇒̂. In the case of C, the domain is
the set of sets E of proof-terms wich satisfy the usual properties of reducibility
candidates:
(CR1) E ⊆ SN
(CR2) if π ∈ E and π → π
′, then π′ ∈ E
(CR3) if π is neutral and all its (one-step) reducts are in E, then π is also in E
and E⇒̂F is the set {π, for all π′ ∈ E, ππ′ ∈ F}, for all E,F ∈ C.
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2.3 Not known to be complete
Reducibility candidates are sound, in the sense that having a C-valued model is
a sufficient condition for a theory to be strongly normalizing. But they are not
known to be complete. In order to prove that having a C-calued model is also
a necessary condition for a theory to be strongly normalizing, the naive idea to
prove the converse of the adequation lemma does not work: usual reducibility
candidates are not adapted to typing as the reducibility candidate associated to
a propostion A does not contain only proofs of A. In fact, because of the (CR3)
property, all reducibility candidates contain all neutral normal proof-terms (as
they have no reduct). Hence αα is in all reducibility candidates, whereas it
cannot be the proof of a proposition in a strongly normalizing theory: if we can
type αα then there exists two propositions A and B and a context Γ such that
Γ ⊢ α : A and Γ ⊢ α : A ⇒ B. Therefore A ≡ A ⇒ B. Hence, if we write
δ = λα.αα, we have Γ ⊢ δ : A⇒ B and also Γ ⊢ δ : A, by equivalence of A and
A⇒ B. Finally we obtain Γ ⊢ δδ : B whereas δδ is not normalizing as it reduces
to itself in one step of β-reduction. This leads to define the notion of well-typed
reducibility candidates, to avoid neutral normal unwell-typed proof-terms to be
in all reducibility candidates.
3 Well-typed reducibility candidates
3.1 C
≡
, the tva of ≡-well-typed reducibility candidates
In order to build reducibility candidates which contain only proofs of the asso-
ciated proposition (i.e. adapted to typing), the first idea is to consider ordered
pairs of a context and a proof-term, rather than only proof-terms (as a typing
judgement associates such an ordered pair to a proposition). And then, restrict
the (CR3) property to well-typed terms: each reducibility candidates has an as-
sociated proposition and only proofs of this proposition can be added using the
(CR3) property. As typing depends on the congruence relation, the ldtva C≡
of well-typed reducibility candidates depends on the theory we study. Given a




, ⇒̊, (ÅT ), (̊∀T )〉 as: the domain C≡
is the set of sets E of ordered pairs of a context and a proof, wich satisfy the
following properties:
(CR≡) There exists AE such that ∀(Γ, π) ∈ E, Γ ⊢ π : AE
(CR1≡) If (Γ, π) ∈ E, then π ∈ SN
(CR2≡) If (Γ, π) ∈ E, and π → π
′, then (Γ, π′) ∈ E
(CR3≡) If π is neutral, Γ ⊢ π : AE ,
and for all one-step reducts τ of π, (Γ, τ) ∈ E, then (Γ, π) ∈ E.
E⇒̊F = {(Γ, π), such that for all (Γ ′, π′) ∈ E, (ΓΓ ′, ππ′) ∈ F},
Remind that we may have to rename proof-variables in π′ and Γ ′.
ÅT = {f : T̂ 7→ C≡ , such that there exists Af ∈ P and xf such that
for all t ∈ T̂ and (Γ, π) ∈ f(t), Γ ⊢ π : (t/xf )Af}
and ∀̊T f = {(Γ, π) such that for all t ∈ T̂ , (Γ, πt) ∈ f(t)}.





Given this notion of reducibility candidates, we are able to define a C
≡
-valued
interpretation which is a model when the associated theory is strongly normal-
izing.
A connectives-adapted interpretation We define a first C
≡
-interpretation
[.]. built-up from the interpretation of atomic propositions, by ⇒̊ and ∀̊.
[P t1 . . . tn]ϕ = {(Γ, π) such that π ∈ SN and Γ ⊢ π : (P t1 . . . tn)ϕ}
[B ⇒ C]ϕ = [B]ϕ⇒̊[C]ϕ
[∀x.B]ϕ = ∀̊T (t 7→ [B]ϕ+〈x,t〉)
First we can notice that for all A ∈ P and ϕ ∈ Val(A), [A]ϕ is not empty as
it contains (α : Aϕ, α). In fact, we can even prove that if π is isolated, strongly
normalizing and Γ ⊢ π : Aϕ then (Γ, π) ∈ [A]ϕ.
This interpretation is, by construction, always adapted to typing (thanks to
the definitions of ⇒̊, ∀̊ and the atomic case) and adapted to the connectives, but
it is not necessarily adapted to the congruence. In other words, [.]. is a model
but not necessarily a model of the thory. Indeed in a theory which contains two
atomic propositions P and Q such that P ≡ (Q⇒ Q) (notice that such a theory
can be strongly normalizing), then for all valuations ϕ ∈ Val(P ) ∩ Val(Q), we
cannot prove [P ]ϕ = [Q]ϕ⇒̊[Q]ϕ. We have then to modify this interpretation to
make it a C
≡
-valued model of 〈T,F,P〉≡ (i.e. also adapted to the congruence).
Adapting to the congruence Making this interpretation adapted to the con-
gruence is not difficult: we just take the intersection of all the first interpretations





Of course this interpretation is still adapted to typing and non-empty, but it
is not necessarily adapted to the connectives anymore. The main point of this
first completeness theorem is to prove that it is still adapted to the connectives
when the theory is strongly normalizing. We proceed by contraposition, showing
that if ⌊.⌋. is not adapted to the connectives, then we can exhibit a well-typed
proof-term which is not strongly normalizing. If there exists A,B ∈ P, ϕ ∈
Val(A ⇒ B) or ϕ′ ∈ Val(∀x.A) with x of sort T , x /∈ dom(ϕ′) such that
⌊A⇒ B⌋ϕ 6= ⌊A⌋ϕ⇒̃⌊B⌋ϕ or ⌊∀x.A⌋ϕ′ 6= ∀̊T (t 7→ ⌊A⌋ϕ′+〈x,t〉), then there exists
C ∈ P, ψ ∈ Val(C) and π such that Γ ⊢ π : Cψ and (Γ, π) /∈ ⌊C⌋ψ. And we can
then go backward to the first interpretation and exhibit D ∈ P, ψ ∈ Val(D)
and π′ such that Γ ⊢ π′ : Dψ and (Γ, π
′) /∈ [D]ψ. Finally, we can prove that if
there exists such a D, then there also exists an atomic propostion which satisfies
the same property. And we conclude by definition of the first interpretation
on atomic propositions, that there exists a well-typed proof-term which is not
strongly normalizing, i.e. the theory is not strongly normalizing.
3.3 C
≡
-models are also sound but depend on the theory
We proved that having a C
≡
-valued model is a complete condition for a theory
to be strongly normalizing. It is not difficult to prove that it is also a sound
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condition. Indeed, you can notice that in the adequation lemma, the fact that the
considered proof-term is well-typed is assumed. We can therefore use the (CR3≡)
property instead of the usual (CR3), when adapting the proof of [4]. We get,
this way, a first sound and complete condition for strongly normalizing theories.
But this condition does not give a characterization of strong normalization as
theories having some sort of model: as we said above, the algebra C
≡
depends on
the studied theory, and we have therefore defined a different criterium for each
theory.
4 Theory-independent complete reducibility candidates
In this section we define a new ldtva C′ which does not depend on a theory
anymore and we prove completeness of C′-models by defining a morphism from
each C
≡
to C′. In this section, we write [π′/α]π the substitution with capture of
α by π′ in π.
4.1 Another (CR3) property
First, we naturally consider in this section sets of proof-terms again, and we do
not mention contexts in the ldtva we build, as we do not want to depend on
typing anymore.
We define C′ = 〈C′, ⇒̃, (ÃT ), (∀̃T )〉 as follows: the domain of C
′ as sets E of proof-
terms which satisfy the usual (CR1), (CR2) and another modified version of (CR3):
(CR′3) E 6= ∅ and for all n ∈ N, for all ν, µ1, . . . , µn ∈ T , if
- for all i ≤ n, µi is neutral and not normal,
- ∀ρ1, . . . , ρn such that for all i ≤ n, µi → ρi, [ρi/αi]i≤nν ∈ E
then [µi/αi]i≤nν ∈ E.
And we use the usual interpretations of connectives:
E⇒̃F = {π ∈ SN such that for all π′ ∈ E, ππ′ ∈ F}
ÃT = T̂ 7→ C
′ and ∀̃T .f = {π such that for all t ∈ T̂ , πt ∈ f(t)}
The not so simple proof that this defines a ldtva can be found in [2].
This (CR′3) property is different from the usual (CR3) on two points. First, as
we said above, the problem with usual reducibility candidates for being complete
comes from the fact that all neutral normal proof-terms belong to all candidates
because of the (CR3) property. With this new definition, we do not allow neutral
normal proof-terms but only neutral not normal proof-terms whose all one-step
reducts are in the set. For example, αα can’t be added to a set using this new
property. In a second step, those neutral not normal proof-terms are not allowed
only at the root of a proof-term but at the root of different subtrees of this
proof-term. For example, if we note K = λα.λβ.α and if λγ.γ is in a set E, then
λγ.(Kγ δ) can be added by (CR′3) to E: we take ν = λγ.α1 and µ1 = Kγ δ.
µ1 is neutral, not normal and its only leaf is γ, with (γ/α1)ν = λγ.γ which is in
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E. We can notice that λγ.(Kγ δ) is not neutral therefore it couldn’t has been
added with the usual (CR3) property.
Finally, (CR′3) allows to add not neutral proof-terms to a set E, unlike (CR3),
but these proof-terms will always reduce to an element of E (still unlike (CR3)).
4.2 Soundness of C′-models
In the usual proof of the adequation lemma, (CR3) is used twice: first to prove
that all candidates are non-empty as they contain all variables, and then to prove
that if λα.π is of type A⇒ B, then it is in JAK⇒̂JBK. In (CR3’) we have now to
suppose explicitely that the considered set is not empty.
In order to prove that λα.π is in JAK⇒̂JBK, we take π′ ∈ JAK and we prove
that (λα.π) π′ is in JBK. We can notice that in this case, (λα.π) π′ is not normal
and we can therefore use (CR′3) (with ν = α1) instead of (CR3).
Hence, adapting the adequation lemma to (CR′3) can be done without any
difficulty, and therefore, having a C′-model is still a sound condition for strongly
normalizing theories in minimal deduction modulo.
4.3 Completeness of C′-models
In order to prove that C′-models provide also a complete semantics for strongly
normalizing theories, the idea is to build a morphism (called Cl) from each C
≡
to this new ldtva C′ so that each C
≡
-model will be led to a C′-model. Therefore
as soon as a theory is strongly normalizing, it has a C′-model: the image by the
morphism of the C
≡
-model we built in section 3.
We first filter sets in C
≡
by a context ∆, in order to consider only proof-
terms which are well-typed in a same context. It is convenient that ∆ contains
an infinite number of variables for each proposition: ∆ = (βAi : A)A∈P,i∈N. We
define the first step of the morphism as:
Cl0(E) = {π, ∃∆′ ⊆ ∆ finite such that (∆′, π) ∈ E} (for all sets E ∈ C
≡
).
Those sets are not in C′ because they do not satisfy (CR′3) as they contain only
well-typed proof-terms. And then we want to saturate those sets by (CR′3), in
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order to obtain elements of C′. Let us now explane why we could not build a
morphism from C
≡
to the usual C. If we write, for this paragraph, Cl(E) for
the saturation by (CR3) of Cl
0(E), we want, for all sets E,F ∈ C
≡
, to have
Cl(E⇒̊F ) = Cl(E)⇒̃Cl(F ) (and an analog property for ∀̊ and ∀̃). That is why
we allowed not neutral proof-terms in (CR′3): if we take π in Cl(F ) such that
(∆,π) /∈ F and α not free in π, then λα.π is in Cl(E)⇒̃Cl(F ) because for all
π′ ∈ Cl(E), (λα.π)π′ is neutral not normal and all its reducts are in Cl(F )
(by induction on the maximal length of a reductions sequence from π′: if π′ is
normal, then the only reduct of (λα.π)π′ is π wich is in Cl(F ) by hypothesis).
But λα.π /∈ Cl(E⇒̊F ) and could not had been added to Cl(E⇒̊F ) by the usual
(CR3) as it is not neutral.
Finally, the actual definition of Cl(E) is the following one:
Cl0(E) = {π, ∃∆′ ⊆ ∆ finite such that (∆′, π) ∈ E}
Clk+1(E) = {π, such that ∃n ∈ N:
∃ν,∃(µi)i≤n, each neutral not normal such that
π = [µi/αi]i≤n ν and ∀(ρi)i≤n, s.t. ∀i ≤ n, µi → ρi,
we have [ρi/αi]i≤n ν ∈ Cl
k(E)}
Cl(E) = ∪j∈N Cl
j(E)
We can prove that this function Cl is actually a morphism from each C
≡
to C′
(in particular, for all E ∈ C
≡
, Cl(E) satisfies (CR1) and (CR2)). Hence, as soon
as a theory is strongly normalizing, it has a C′-valued model : Cl ◦ ⌊.⌋.. Notice
that tt is non-empty because of the fact that ⌊.⌋. is non-empty. Therefore having
a C′-valued model is also a complete condition for strongly normalizing theories.
Conclusion
We have defined a refinement of truth values algebras which allows to build
more precise models. Then we exhibited one of these truth values algebras C′
such that having a non-empty C′-valued model is a sound and complete condi-
tion for strongly normalizing theories.While soundness is an usual property, this
completeness result is, up to our knowledge, the first for strongly normalizing
theories, in deduction modulo.
We proved this completeness theorem in an original way: build a structure
adapted to the congruence relation and then show that it is also adapted to
connectives when the theory is strongly normalizing. This way, we are able to
build an interpretation of propositions adapted to the congruence relation, even
if the theory is not strongly normalizing.
In future work, we wish to extend this result to other logical frameworks
with or without modulo. We want to extend first this result to (complete) De-
duction modulo, and to λΠ-calculus modulo [3]. We also want to study how
these language-dependent truth values algebras can help us in building models
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